The Shield that Never Was: Societies with Single-Peaked Preferences are More Open to Manipulation and Control

Much work has been devoted, during the past twenty years, to using complexity to protect elections from manipulation and control. Many results have been obtained showing NP-hardness shields, and recently there has been much focus on whether such worst-case hardness protections can be bypassed by frequently correct heuristics or by approximations. This paper takes a very different approach: We argue that when electorates follow the canonical political science model of societal preferences the complexity shield never existed in the first place. In particular, we show that for electorates having single-peaked preferences, many existing NP-hardness results on manipulation and control evaporate.Comment: 38 pages, 2 figure

P-Selectivity, Immunity, and the Power of One Bit

We prove that P-sel, the class of all P-selective sets, is EXP-immune, but is not EXP/1-immune. That is, we prove that some infinite P-selective set has no infinite EXP-time subset, but we also prove that every infinite P-selective set has some infinite subset in EXP/1. Informally put, the immunity of P-sel is so fragile that it is pierced by a single bit of information. The above claims follow from broader results that we obtain about the immunity of the P-selective sets. In particular, we prove that for every recursive function f, P-sel is DTIME(f)-immune. Yet we also prove that P-sel is not \Pi_2^p/1-immune

Existence versus Exploitation: The Opacity of Backbones and Backdoors Under a Weak Assumption

Backdoors and backbones of Boolean formulas are hidden structural properties. A natural goal, already in part realized, is that solver algorithms seek to obtain substantially better performance by exploiting these structures. However, the present paper is not intended to improve the performance of SAT solvers, but rather is a cautionary paper. In particular, the theme of this paper is that there is a potential chasm between the existence of such structures in the Boolean formula and being able to effectively exploit them. This does not mean that these structures are not useful to solvers. It does mean that one must be very careful not to assume that it is computationally easy to go from the existence of a structure to being able to get one's hands on it and/or being able to exploit the structure. For example, in this paper we show that, under the assumption that P $\neq$ NP, there are easily recognizable families of Boolean formulas with strong backdoors that are easy to find, yet for which it is hard (in fact, NP-complete) to determine whether the formulas are satisfiable. We also show that, also under the assumption P $\neq$ NP, there are easily recognizable sets of Boolean formulas for which it is hard (in fact, NP-complete) to determine whether they have a large backbone

The Complexity of Computing Minimal Unidirectional Covering Sets

Given a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives, a common thread in the social sciences is to identify subsets of alternatives that satisfy certain notions of stability. Examples can be found in areas as diverse as voting theory, game theory, and argumentation theory. Brandt and Fischer [BF08] proved that it is NP-hard to decide whether an alternative is contained in some inclusion-minimal upward or downward covering set. For both problems, we raise this lower bound to the Theta_{2}^{p} level of the polynomial hierarchy and provide a Sigma_{2}^{p} upper bound. Relatedly, we show that a variety of other natural problems regarding minimal or minimum-size covering sets are hard or complete for either of NP, coNP, and Theta_{2}^{p}. An important consequence of our results is that neither minimal upward nor minimal downward covering sets (even when guaranteed to exist) can be computed in polynomial time unless P=NP. This sharply contrasts with Brandt and Fischer's result that minimal bidirectional covering sets (i.e., sets that are both minimal upward and minimal downward covering sets) are polynomial-time computable.Comment: 27 pages, 7 figure

Spin-injection Hall effect in a planar photovoltaic cell

Successful incorporation of the spin degree of freedom in semiconductor technology requires the development of a new paradigm allowing for a scalable, non-destructive electrical detection of the spin-polarization of injected charge carriers as they propagate along the semiconducting channel. In this paper we report the observation of a spin-injection Hall effect (SIHE) which exploits the quantum-relativistic nature of spin-charge transport and which meets all these key requirements on the spin detection. The two-dimensional electron-hole gas photo-voltaic cell we designed to observe the SIHE allows us to develop a quantitative microscopic theory of the phenomenon and to demonstrate its direct application in optoelectronics. We report an experimental realization of a non-magnetic spin-photovoltaic effect via the SIHE, rendering our device an electrical polarimeter which directly converts the degree of circular polarization of light to a voltage signal.Comment: 14 pages, 4 figure

Credimus

We believe that economic design and computational complexity---while already important to each other---should become even more important to each other with each passing year. But for that to happen, experts in on the one hand such areas as social choice, economics, and political science and on the other hand computational complexity will have to better understand each other's worldviews. This article, written by two complexity theorists who also work in computational social choice theory, focuses on one direction of that process by presenting a brief overview of how most computational complexity theorists view the world. Although our immediate motivation is to make the lens through which complexity theorists see the world be better understood by those in the social sciences, we also feel that even within computer science it is very important for nontheoreticians to understand how theoreticians think, just as it is equally important within computer science for theoreticians to understand how nontheoreticians think

More Natural Models of Electoral Control by Partition

"Control" studies attempts to set the outcome of elections through the addition, deletion, or partition of voters or candidates. The set of benchmark control types was largely set in the seminal 1992 paper by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick that introduced control, and there now is a large literature studying how many of the benchmark types various election systems are vulnerable to, i.e., have polynomial-time attack algorithms for. However, although the longstanding benchmark models of addition and deletion model relatively well the real-world settings that inspire them, the longstanding benchmark models of partition model settings that are arguably quite distant from those they seek to capture. In this paper, we introduce--and for some important cases analyze the complexity of--new partition models that seek to better capture many real-world partition settings. In particular, in many partition settings one wants the two parts of the partition to be of (almost) equal size, or is partitioning into more than two parts, or has groups of actors who must be placed in the same part of the partition. Our hope is that having these new partition types will allow studies of control attacks to include such models that more realistically capture many settings

Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules

Abstract. To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings, the voters may often only provide partial orders. This directly leads to the POSSIBLE WINNER problem that asks, given a set of partial votes, if a distinguished candidate can still become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER for the broad class of voting protocols defined by scoring rules. A scoring rule provides a score value for every position which a candidate can have in a linear order. Prominent examples include plurality, k-approval, and Borda. Generalizing previous NP-hardness results for some special cases and providing new many-one reductions, we settle the computational complexity for all but one scoring rule. More precisely, for an unbounded number of candidates and unweighted voters, we show that POSSI-BLE WINNER is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (2,1,..., 1, 0), while it is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto.